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Spain in the United Nations: Sixtieth Anniversary 
Xavier PONS RAFOLS* 
Abstract: On the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of Spain’s admission into the United Nations (UN), which took place 
in 1955, this article provides a summary of the principal Spanish contributions to this International Organization, especially 
from the point of view of Public International Law. At the same time, I seek to show how the UN has contributed to 
Spain’s own political, economic and social evolution, and what these sixty years of membership in this Organization have 
meant for our country, given that the UN expresses the universal aspirations to peace, development and human rights as no 
other organization does. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As of 2015, Spain has been in the UN for sixty years, which makes for an excellent occasion for 
composing —albeit in summary form— an evaluation of Spain’s incorporation into this international 
organization par excellence. This is a “bottom line” that has to be formulated in very general terms, 
given that sixty years of Spain’s presence in the UN has implied hundreds of actions, speeches and 
declarations, proposals, the co-sponsorship of resolutions, support of specific actions, many 
multilateral diplomatic tasks, participation in activities and voting in the various organs of the UN. 
All of these activities—be they of greater or lesser relevance—reflect Spain’s participation in and 
evolving commitment to the UN. This Organization, over the 70 years since its creation, has 
experienced many crises and difficulties, many moments of extreme weakness, many limit situations, 
many failures. Nonetheless, the UN has always shown the ability to overcome these situations, rising 
up and continuing to advance, from a multilateral perspective, towards the attainment of its great and 
universal aspirations.1  
 The first section of my study is of an introductory character, describing the general approach I 
have taken with this article. In this first section, I will tentatively divide Spain’s participation and 
interaction with the UN into broad time periods (1). A second section will deal with the principal 
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1  The United Nations Association of Spain (ANUE in Spanish) has published two works, one on the occasion of the 
50th anniversary of Spain’s admission into the UN and one on its 60th, both involving the collaboration of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC in Spanish). In these books, with the participation of a large group of professors, 
diplomats and United Nations officials, analysed various aspects of the UN’s activity together with the main elements of 
Spain’s presence in the UN. Both works also feature a useful and interesting appendix with data and statistics on the 
Spanish presence in the Organization, compiled by Ariadna Quintero Valderrama. These two works, which I had the honour 
of coordinating, and which will necessarily be cited over the course of this study, are X. Pons Rafols (coord.), España y la 
ONU. 50 aniversario (Icaria/ANUE, Barcelona 2005, hereinafter España y la ONU); and X. Pons Rafols (dir.), Las Naciones 
Unidas desde España. 70 aniversario de las Naciones Unidas. 60 aniversario del ingreso de España en las Naciones Unidas 
(ANUE, Barcelona 2015, hereinafter Las Naciones Unidas desde España). 
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political and legal issues that were present at the moment that Spain were admitted into the UN in 
1955, after a decade during which the Franco regime was the object of sanctions and international 
marginalization (2). The following section, dealing with certain substantive issues regarding the 
actions of the UN and Spain, focuses on the UN and on the recognition and guarantee of human 
rights in Spain (3). Next, I analyse the role of the UN and Spain concerning the principle of self-
determination of peoples, both in regards to Spanish colonial territories and their decolonization, as 
well as the permanent Spanish claim to Gibraltar before the UN (4). The following section will deal 
with the contributions of Spain to the UN’s peacekeeping operations, and what this contribution has 
meant in terms of the modernization, internationalisation and the worldwide image of Spanish Armed 
Forces (5). In addition, I will discuss the participation of Spain in the mechanisms of pacific 
settlement of international disputes as well as the codification and progressive development of 
International Law, and its incorporation into the system of Spanish law (6). Finally, I will briefly 
analyse some of the most important Spanish initiatives and contributions, such as those relating to 
the reform of the Security Council, the struggle against terrorism and the Alliance of Civilizations (7). 
Before finishing my study, I will present certain final remarks that will provide a synthesis of this 
general evaluation of Spain in the UN. 
GENERAL APPROACH AND PERIODS OF SPAIN’S PRESENCE IN THE UN 
In addition to its absolutely general character, the approach I propose is characterized by a double 
point of view of a bidirectional character. First, I highlight some of the principal contributions that 
Spain has made to the UN. Secondly, I will describe key aspects of what sixty years of UN 
membership has meant for the political, economic and social evolution of Spain, as part of an 
Organization that expresses —as nothing else does— the universal aspirations to peace, development 
and human rights. Over the course of the following pages I will focus on this interaction: the impact 
of the UN, its principles and its work on Spain and in our country’s evolution, as well as the impact 
of Spain’s contribution to the United Nations. 
 Spain was admitted to the UN on December 14, 1955, which adds up to 60 years of membership in 
this international organization.2 Since then, both the UN as well as Spain have undergone enormous 
changes and evolution, the fruit of an intense process of historical evolution and of deep social, 
political and economic transformations. The changes in our world have been deep and broad: 
scientific and technological advances; economic growth; globalisation; new social orientations and 
changes in behaviour and ways of life; the Cold War and its end; the growth of the number of 
Member States due to decolonization and the dismemberment of a number of countries in central and 
eastern Europe; environmental risks; new international concerns; the progressive humanization of 
international society; and an enormous number of other changes of all types. Together, these 
influences have profoundly transformed our world over the past sixty years. 
                                                
2  Resolution 995 (X), of the General Assembly, of December 14, 1955. The UN’s admission procedure requires a prior 
recommendation by the Security Council, which was obtained through to Resolution 109 (1955), of December 14, 1955. 
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 These are transformations that are reflected in the UN, and, in spectacular fashion, have been 
recognizable in the evolution of Spanish society starting in the 1950s. Over the course of these years 
Spain has passed from its long and dark night of Francoism to its current situation as a developed 
democratic State, a member of the European Union, fully incorporated into the international 
community and with a young and advanced society that is prepared for change. We cannot overlook, 
certainly, the profound economic crisis that is still affecting our country, and which has become 
intertwined with a very important political-institutional crisis. However, there is hope that these 
difficulties may give rise to new varieties of transformations and progress along a clear path of 
democratic advances.  
 For many anti-Francoist democrats the admission of Spain to the UN was a profound 
disappointment. After WWII the Allied powers did not complete their work of destroying Nazi and 
fascist regimes by intervening in Spain and bringing down the Franco regime.3 For these democrats, 
the UN, its constitutive document —the Charter of the UN— and especially the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 were an important reference point for democratic change and 
the recognition of human rights. However, these rights and this Charter contrasted with, were even 
absolutely incompatible with, the reality of the political regime existing at that moment in our 
country. The United Nations was the democratic ideal that they fought for, and for which they were 
unjustly repressed by the Francoist authorities.4 Despite Spain’s admission to the UN, the Franco 
regime did not change even a hair of its authoritarian and antidemocratic character. This fact also 
shines a light on the fundamental political realities and the intrinsic weaknesses of the UN, which was 
designed to be an inter-State organization. Even though the UN has suffered from these intrinsic 
weaknesses and failures, in my view the UN was and continues to be a useful instrument that is both 
indispensable and well adapted for confronting the interconnected challenges of today’s world.5 
 From this perspective, and taking into account the corresponding evolution of the political 
situation in Spain, I believe that three periods can be distinguished within the course of the sixty 
years that have passed since Spain joined the UN. The first twenty years, making for a first stage 
lasting from 1955 to 1975, were passed under the Franco regime but lit the way to the regime’s end 
upon the death of the dictator. During these years, Spain maintained a low profile, severely limited in 
its activities and marginal within the overall context of the UN. Spain was under the thumb of an 
authoritarian regime that would only slowly open itself to the outside world. Nonetheless, it 
maintained overseas colonies and received aid funds for development. During these years the regime 
                                                
3  Cf., for example, F. Casares Potau, “Entre la decepción y la esperanza”, in España y la ONU,  at 95-104. 
4  I would also like to note the 1963 creation in Barcelona of the Association of Friends of the United Nations 
(currently the United Nations Association of Spain, ANUE). Cf., in this regard, M. Díez de Velasco Vallejo, “Mis años en 
la Asociación para las Naciones Unidas en España”, in España y la ONU,  at 105-108; F. Ll. Cardona Castro, “La Asociación 
para las Naciones Unidas en España”, España y la ONU,  at 79-94; as well as the commemorative book Una trayectoria con 
futuro. 40 años de historia de la Asociación para las Naciones Unidas (A Path with a Future. 40 Years of History of the United 
Nations Association) (ANUE, Barcelona 2001). 
5  With so much potential and capacity for adaptation to changes, I believe we can perfectly well speak of a “resilient” 
United Nations (cf. X. Pons Rafols, “Unas Naciones Unidas resilientes en su setenta aniversario”, in Las Naciones Unidas 
desde España,  at 85-110). 
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restricted itself to seeing the UN as a kind of international conference, reducing it to a mere scenario 
for diplomatic activities that permitted it to maintain its doors open to the outside.6 
 These first twenty years of Spain’s membership were also the years in which the UN began to 
multiply the international instruments it had available in the area of human rights. Spain kept a 
distance from these initiatives, which is hardly surprising given the regime’s non-democratic character. 
Nonetheless, Spain was not the object of special denunciations in the UN, a situation resulting from 
the weakness of existing international instruments. The general direction of the UN, based initially 
on the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the States —as stated in article 2.6 of the 
Charter— has changed in recent decades. This has been especially true since the end of the Cold War, 
and the UN now has a firm commitment to promoting and strengthening democracy, the rule of law 
and guarantees of human rights. A sample of this evolution came at the end of this stage, on the 
occasion of the last executions by the Franco regime, which took place on September 27, 1975. The 
UN and its General Secretary, together with other world leaders, such as Pope Paul VI and the then 
European Communities, inundated Franco with pleas for a pardon, pleas that were never answered. 
 For obvious reasons stemming from the principle of equitable geographic distribution, during this 
first stage Spain participated in both the General Assembly as well as some of the principal and 
subsidiary organs of the UN.7 For example, Spain was a non-permanent member of the Security 
Council for the two year period from 1969-1970, as well as of the Economic and Social Council for the 
three year periods from 1959-1961 and from 1972-1975. This relatively low-profile participation as a 
member of the UN did not mesh with certain daring, inexplicable initiatives, such as that of seeking 
to be a non-permanent member of the Security Council the year after our country’s admission. As 
Juan Antonio Yáñez-Barnuevo has noted, this first attempt on the part of Spain —in competition 
with Sweden— to obtain a seat on the Security Council ended, as was to be expected, in complete 
failure.8 
 A second stage in the relations between the UN and Spain, though of a much shorter duration, 
corresponds to the years of transition to democracy in our country, a moment during which Spain 
began to join various programs and conventions on human rights, both those of the UN as well as of 
the Council of Europe.9 I believe that what most stands out in this brief but politically complex stage 
is precisely Spain’s joining the UN treaties on human rights. It was on April 27, 1977 —even before 
the first democratic elections in our country, held on the 15th of June, 1977, and only a few days after 
                                                
6  However, there are those in Spain that take an internationalist position, holding to a transformational vision of the 
future, and who value the UN as a forum and as an authentic instrument for cooperation amongst States (cf. J.A. Carrillo 
Salcedo, “Las Naciones Unidas: una interpretación de ciencia política”, 17 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional (1964) 
516-527). 
7  Over these twenty years Spain repeatedly held one of the vice-presidencies of the General Assembly: in 1958, 1965, 
1973 and 1974. In contrast, Spain has only served as the President of the General Assembly once. It was in 1985 that the 
Spanish ambassador, Jaime de Piniés, was elected to the presidency of the fortieth period of sessions of the General 
Assembly. 
8  Cf. J.A. Yáñez-Barnuevo, “Setenta años de las Naciones Unidas: algunas reflexiones desde una vida en la diplomacia 
multilateral”, in Las Naciones Unidas desde España, p. 63. 
9  Furthermore, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 
November 4, 1950, was only ratified by Spain on October 4, 1979, and recorded in the Official State Gazette (BOE) of 
October 10, 1979. 
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the legalization of the Communist Party— that Spain ratified the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 
1966.10 Along the same lines, on April 14, 1978 it ratified the Convention regarding the status of 
refugees and the protocol relating to that Statute.11 Up to that moment Spain had only ratified the 
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the 1966 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.12 
 In this complex political and economic scenario, Spain received widespread support during the 
process of democratic transition, some provided by our neighbouring countries and some by the 
United States of America itself.13 However, the UN of those years did not have anything like its 
present-day commitment to aiding democratic political systems, to democratization and to free 
elections; this is a commitment that has been strengthened since the end of the Cold War. If more 
recent viewpoints had existed at that time, they would doubtless have contributed to strengthening 
the process of democratic transition as well as certain relevant aspects, such as transitional justice, that 
were in fact ignored during Spain’s transition. Starting from these initial baby steps, our country’s 
participation in the activities and programs of the UN has grown constantly. 
 The third stage, which was also the longest, covers more than half of Spain’s sixty years as a 
member State of the UN; it corresponds to Spain’s democratic and constitutional maturation. It 
stands out as a country that respects its international commitments, and is fully committed to an 
effective multiculturalism. Over this period, our country has been an ever more active participant in 
the functioning of the UN, having become a country that is internationally relevant —an indisputable 
intermediate power, as I see it—, active in providing international assistance to developing countries 
and a net contributor to the programs of the UN.14 It is practically impossible to synthesize the nearly 
forty years of Spain’s participation in the UN as a democratic State. Still, one can get the gist 
through the annual speeches given during the general debate that opens the annual sessions of the 
General Assembly, speeches that reveal the itinerary of Spain’s evolution as a fully committed member 
State. On many occasions these speeches have been the responsibility of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation; however, in certain years, in particular those which have been especially 
relevant from the perspective of Spanish politics, the Heads of State, King Juan Carlos I and later 
King Felipe VI, have given the speeches.15 
                                                
10  BOE of April 30, 1977. 
11  BOE of October 21, 1978. 
12  To which it acceded on September 13, 1968 (BOE of February 8, 1969 and of May 10 1969, respectively).  
13  With, for example, the results of the official visit of King Juan Carlos I to Washington in June of 1976, when the 
monarch gave a speech to the U.S. Congress. 
14  An increase in budgetary contributions followed on this evolution: one need only note that Spain’s annual 
contribution to the UN for 1956 was 1.14% of the total (in an Organization with 76 member states) while for the two year 
period of 2014-2015 it contributed 2.97% (in an Organization of 193 member states). This places our country at 9th place as a 
contributor to the ordinary budget of the UN. For the budget for peacekeeping operations—which follows other criteria for 
funds—this 2.9% means that our country is the tenth largest contributor. 
15  Although the King’s speeches are prepared by the Government. King Juan Carlos I spoke for the first time in the 
general debate of the General Assembly in 1986 (cf. the minutes of the session on September 22, 1986, Document A/41/PV.4). 
King Philip VI spoke for the first time as King only a few months after his coronation, on September 24, 2014 (cf. the 
minutes of the session in Document A/69/PV.6). 
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 To highlight just one institutional aspect of Spain’s presence in the UN in this third, and longest, 
stage, our country has been elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council on four other 
occasions, i.e. the two-year periods corresponding to 1981-1982, 1993-1994, 2003-2004 and, most 
recently —in a genuine success for Spanish diplomacy— for the current 2015-2016 period.16 This most 
recent elected term represents a responsibility and an important challenge for Spain’s foreign policy 
(as on the other occasions, certainly). Nonetheless, Spain has an element that distinguishes it in terms 
of its internal politics. Its campaign for a new period as a non-permanent membership of the Security 
Council began in 2005 with a government of the Socialist Party; later, a government of the People’s 
Party continued this UN campaign until the objective was attained. On the other hand, as on an 
earlier occasion (the two-year period of 2003-2004), general elections are being held while Spain holds 
a seat on the Council (elections planned for December 20, 2015). This could provoke a change in the 
governing party, or, at least, a rearrangement of the system of political parties in Spain. The principal 
political forces fully shared the goal of attaining Security Council membership, with the conviction 
that it would mean a greater relevance and presence for Spain in the international community. 
However, this presence involves a greater responsibility, which in turn implies a policy that is shared 
among the principal parties. Such a policy would mean that Spain becomes more proactive, 
maintaining a better-defined profile and a greater international presence. 
 Along these lines, I hold that Spain’s participation in the UN —and now, as a non-permanent 
member of the Security Council— has been clearly guided by a “state policy” that enjoys a consensus 
among the principal political forces, both the party in government as well as those parties of the 
opposition that have the possibility of forming a government. This, however, is not what happened on 
the earlier occasion in which Spain was a non-permanent member of the Security Council, when in 
2003 the government of the People’s Party actively supported the American proposals to form a 
coalition that would accompany the U.S. in its war in Iraq17; the PP government also participated in 
the Azores summit. The war and occupation of Iraq —a genuine attack at the UN’s waterline— also 
led to a schism in the Security Council, a deep division between the various Spanish political forces 
and a great clamour against the war on the part of public opinion. The first act of the new Socialist 
Party government, which won in the elections of March 14, 2004, was precisely to order the 
evacuation of Spanish troops that were participating in a secondary role, helping the U.S. in the war 
against, and occupation of, Iraq. In foreign policy, certainly, there’s no such thing as a friend, only 
interests. I hold, nonetheless, that interests are and must always be the interests of the State as a whole 
                                                
16  Analysing the Spanish presence in the Security Council into time periods also confirms, in a practical manner, that 
10-12 years constitute a reasonable and acceptable rotation interval, so that intermediate powers like Spain can form part of 
the Council. Turkey was defeated in its competition with Spain, since it had only been six years since its last election to the 
Council, and New Zealand’s prudence was rewarded in the first voting, having waited twenty years for a new attempt (cf. 
the analysis of I. Molina, “España en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU 2015-2016: apuntes desde cuatro planos”, 
Comentario Elcano 60/2014, Real Instituto Elcano, 2014). 
17  The then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ana Palacios, participated actively in the famous meeting of the Security 
Council where the Secretary of State of the U.S. sought to demonstrate the existence of WMDs in Iraq (cf. the minutes of 
the February 4, 2003 session of the Security Council, Document S/PV.4701).  
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and not just those of a particular political grouping.18 Looking beyond political differences, political 
actors should always keep in mind Spain’s international role, its commitments to the international 
community and the confidence that Spain should merit among its members. Above all, such political 
actors must bear in mind the great objectives of peace, development and human rights that are clearly 
spelled out by the Charter of the UN, and by the Organization created through this Charter. 
 A final relevant aspect that I would like to mention, and which Spain will confront in 2016 as a 
non-permanent member of the Security Council, is the selection of the man or woman who will take 
Ban Ki-moon’s place as General Secretary, since his second period in office will end on December 31, 
2016. The election for the post of Secretary General is carried out by the General Assembly following 
the recommendation of the Security Council, and in practice rotates among continents. There is also 
a consolidated practice that the person elected be able to complete two periods in office, of five years 
each. Spain already had the responsibility, as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, of 
campaigning for the election, for the first and only time up to now, of a Latin American as General 
Secretary: the Peruvian Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who held the office from 1982 to 1991. The formal 
process of the election is not yet in progress, but various names are being mooted for the post. In 
particular, there are some female candidates from Eastern Europe: up to now no woman has served as 
General Secretary, nor has the post been occupied by anyone from this region. 
THE SPANISH QUESTION AND THE CONTEXT OF SPAIN’S ENTRY TO THE UN IN 1955 
When the UN was created in 1945, Spain was under the thumb of an authoritarian regime that arose 
during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939); the Franco regime had received military aid from the Nazi 
Germany of Hitler and the Fascist Italy of Mussolini.19 The regime did not participate directly in 
WWII —it declared, successively, its neutrality and non-belligerence— but it repaid the earlier 
military aid in a limited way by sending the Blue Division (División Azul).20 The characteristics of the 
regime and this collaboration with the Axis powers made it completely impossible for Spain to be 
invited to the San Francisco Conference where the Charter of the UN was adopted, or to participate 
in the newly-born United Nations. It was in this context —and in the framework of the different 
preparatory meetings for the UN itself that flowed together at the Conference of San Francisco— that 
Article Four of the Charter was written: to establish criteria for the admission of other States as 
members of the UN, with the basic condition that those new member States must be “peace-loving.”21 
                                                
18  In a position contrary to this critical approach, cf. the memoirs of the then-permanent representative of Spain to the 
UN, I. Arias Llamas, “Mis vivencias en la ONU”, in España y la ONU,  at 335-342. 
19  It was in a climate of nationalist exaltation —and with Germanophile members in Franco’s government who had 
supported Spain’s entry into the second World War as part of the Axis— that General Franco met with Hitler in Hendaye 
(France) on October 23, 1940, and then with Mussolini in Bordighera (Italy) on February 12 of 1941. 
20  This division participated in combat alongside German forces on the Russian front, starting with the moment in 
which Germany declared war on the Soviet Union in June of 1941. It was withdrawn from the front in December 1943, when 
the predicted course of the war turned against Germany. 
21  Cf. in this regard, for example, J.A. Carrillo Salcedo, “La noción de Estados amantes de la paz, cincuenta años 
después de la entrada en vigor de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas”, 13 Anuario Hispano-Luso-Americano de Derecho 
Internacional (1997) 157-180. 
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States that had aided the Axis powers could not be considered as potential new Member States, so 
long as their formerly Axis-allied regimes remained in power.22 In August of 1945, at the Potsdam 
Conference —with the UN Charter already adopted but before its entrance into effect— the Allied 
powers clearly declared that they would not support the candidacy of the Spanish Government to 
form part of the UN.23 
 From that moment on, until 1955, the “Spanish question” would be in the air at the UN, a question 
that implied international diplomatic sanctions and a diplomatic blockade against the Franco regime.24 
The first condemnations of the Francoist regime took place during the first set of sessions of the 
General Assembly via Resolution 32 (I) of that Assembly on February 9, 1946, and followed by 
Resolutions 4 (1946), 7 (1946) and 10 (1946) of the Security Council on April 29, June 26 and 
November 4, respectively. What was most relevant, nevertheless, was Resolution 39 (I) of the General 
Assembly, on December 12, 1946, entitled “Relations of Members of the UN with Spain”, which 
recommended three types of sanctions against our country. In the first place, the government of Spain 
was excluded from all conferences and international organizations of the UN system. In second place, 
the Security Council would adopt any necessary measures if in “a reasonable amount of time a new 
Government is not formed that draws its legitimacy from the consensus of the governed”. Finally, in 
third place, it was recommended that the Ambassadors or Ministers plenipotentiary who were 
accredited in Madrid should be immediately recalled. 
 Not only did the Security Council not agree on the adoption of measures against the Francoist 
regime, but in the next period of sessions the diplomatic blockade against that regime began to break 
down.25 The change in political scenarios in the context of the Cold War would soon decisively lessen 
the intensity of the international opposition to the Francoist regime and produce a progressive change 
of orientation. The Korean War, which was a military expression of the Cold War, in the end 
brought with it the adoption of Resolution 386 (V) by the General Assembly, on November 4, 1950, 
which revoked the recommendation to withdraw Ambassadors and Ministers plenipotentiary from 
Madrid. The argument was that the establishment of diplomatic relations did not imply “any 
judgment on the national policies of that government.” In addition, the recommendation that 
impeded Spanish participation in the international organisms established by the UN was revoked as 
well, with the argument that these were technical entities without any political character. 
                                                
22  According to the interpretation of the delegate of Mexico at the Conference of San Francisco, UNCIO, vol. VI, p. 
127. 
23  Generally, especially regarding this process and what was known as the “Spanish Question”, the most complete 
bibliographic references are: A. J. Lleonart y Amselem (dir.), España y ONU (6 vols. ed. CSIC, Madrid 1978-2002); F. 
Portero, Franco aislado. La cuestión española (1945-1950) (Aguilar, Madrid 1989); and I. Sánchez González, Diez años de 
soledad. España, la ONU y la dictadura franquista 1945-1955 (Universidad de Sevilla, Sevilla 2015). 
24  Cf. A.J. Lleonart y Amsélem, “La admisión de España a la luz de los documentos oficiales de las Naciones Unidas”, 
in España y la ONU,  at 37-53. 
25  Resolution 114 (II), of the General Assembly, on November 17, 1947 —without reaffirming the measures adopted by 
the prior Resolution 39 (I)— limited itself to trusting that the Security Council would assume its responsibilities as set out 
in the Charter when it was judged that the situation demanded it, thus diminishing the political authority of Resolution 39 
(I). 
Spain in the UN  
19 SYbIL (2015) 101 – 127 DOI: 10.17103/sybil.19.06 
109
 This change in focus aided in the breakdown of isolation and Spain’s progressive integration into 
international society. The first steps to integration into the UN system were taken in 1951, with 
Spain’s entry into the World Meteorological Organization (WMO); the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO); Spain’s re-entry into the 
Universal Postal Union (UPU) also took place in 1951, and was followed in 1952 by our country’s 
admission into the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).26 
These incorporations, genuine precursors to full integration in the UN, were also accompanied by an 
important change in the attitude of the Allies, in particular the U.S. The new circumstances on the 
international stage resulted in the United States awarding the first financial credits to Spain—even 
though it remained outside the Marshall Plan —accompanied by the first visits of U.S. authorities. All 
of this had the objective of kick-starting negotiations and signing, on September 26 of 1953, the 
various executive agreements— of a political, financial and military nature—between Spain and the 
United States.27 
 A few weeks before the Agreements with the United States were signed, Spain’s diplomacy won 
another triumph for the Francoist regime: the signing with Vatican City, on August 27 of 1953, of a 
Concordat between Spain and the Holy See that would regulate the relationship between the Catholic 
Church and the State. As is well known, the political process of opening the regime to the exterior 
world soon bore fruit in the Stabilization Plan of 1959, which led to the end of autarchy, to the 
adoption of development plans and to the “developism” of the 1960s. The entry of Spain into the 
principal international organisms would have far-reaching effects,28 although Spain clearly had to 
remain at the sidelines of the European Community until a democratic transition had taken place.29 
As before, the regime retained its authoritarian traits, despite its opening to the outside world.30 
 Prior to the admission of Spain to the UN, for a number of years the latter had suffered an 
authentic paralysis in the admission of new Member States. This derived from political controversies 
between the respective sponsors of each bloc, as well as legal quarrels over the procedures and 
conditions for the admission of new States, which even involved two Advisory Opinions of the 
                                                
26  Cf. the analysis of I. Sánchez González, “España ante los organismos técnicos de Naciones Unidas (1946-1953)”, in A. 
Barrio Alonso; J. de Hoyos Puente; R. Saavedra Arias (coords.), Nuevos horizontes del pasado: culturas políticas, identidades y 
formas de representación (Universidad de Cantabria, Santander 2011) at 166 ff. 
27  From a historical perspective regarding these accords, cf. A. Viñas, Los Pactos secretos de Franco con Estados Unidos. 
Bases, ayuda económica, recortes de soberanía (Grijalbo, Barcelona 1981).  
28  In 1958 Spain entered the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), and in 1960 it joined two other organizations of the World Bank Group, namely the International 
Development Association (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Cf. concerning these integrations, F. 
Varela Parache; Manuel Varela Parache, “España y los Organismos Económicos Internacionales”, ICE No. 826 (2005) at 167-
177. 
29  The Preferential Agreement with the European Community remained unsigned until 1970, and it was only in 1977 
that the long negotiations for EC membership began, negotiations that would not bear their fruit until 1985. Spain was 
admitted to the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in 1959, and it would maintain this 
membership when the organism was changed into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
in 1961; in addition, Spain was admitted to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1963. 
30  However, there were some who, from an internationalist perspective, demanded a full integration for Spain on the 
world stage, as well as participation in the trends of international society (cf. A. Pérez Voitúrez, “Las Leyes Fundamentales 
ante el Derecho Internacional”, 22 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional (1969) 248-279). 
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International Court of Justice.31 All of this resulted from confrontations between the two great 
antagonistic blocs originating from the Cold War itself. The negotiations to unblock the admissions 
process finally culminated in the so-called “package deal” articulated in Resolution 995 (X) of 1955, 
which permitted the admission of Spain and of another fifteen States.32 This process made clear the 
vocation of the UN to being a universal International Organization.33 
THE UN AND THE PROMOTION AND GUARANTEE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SPAIN. 
As I have indicated before, the first stage of Spain’s participation in the UN lasted until the end of 
the dictatorship, and coincides with the development within the UN of an ever more important 
system of international norms regarding human rights, with the establishment and perfecting of 
conventional and extra-conventional mechanisms for the protection of those rights. All of these 
instruments and mechanisms had and continue to have as their keystone the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, adopted in 1948 by the General Assembly, at a moment in which the UN still had the 
“Spanish question” on its agenda.34  At nearly seventy years after the signing of the Universal 
Declaration I believe I can justly affirm that this document has an undeniable ethical and legal value. 
The Declaration has contributed enormously to the idea that, while international society continues to 
be at base a matter between States, and even though International Law continues to have the 
sovereignty of States as its fundamental principle, human rights and the fundamental principle of 
human dignity are also being accepted as constitutional principles of today’s international order. 
 It wasn’t until 1977, during the process of democratic transition, that Spain began to adapt itself to 
the UN system of human rights with the ratification of the International Pacts of Civil and Political 
Rights and of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This ratification meant that the Committee of 
Human Rights would track Spain’s progress in human and civil rights. The evaluation of the first 
Report on Spain, presented in 1978, highlighted a constructive focus on the part of the UN human 
                                                
31  Cf. in this regard, e.g. J. D. González Campos, “La admisión de España como miembro de la ONU: unas páginas de 
historia”, in España y la ONU,  at 21-36, in particular,  at 30-35. There is abundant bibliography concerning the conditions 
and procedure for admission to the UN, as well as regarding the political and legal process begun in 1955. However, the 
Revista Española de Derecho Internacional only realized Spain’s admission in a general article by the French professor E. 
Giraud, “Admisión de nuevos miembros en las Naciones Unidas”, 9 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional (1956) 11-31. 
32  Together with Spain, a number of other countries were admitted to the UN as members in conformity with 
Resolution 995 (X): Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Libya, Jordan, Nepal, Portugal, 
Laos, Romania and Sri Lanka. At the last moment, thanks to the political confrontation between the two blocs, Japan and 
Mongolia were taken off the list and were not admitted to the UN that year. With these 16 countries admitted, the UN 
reached 76 member States, which explains the important quantitative leap represented by this multiple admission at that 
time in history. Today there are 193 UN Member States. 
33  Although Spain was admitted to the UN in 1955, thus relegating the “Spanish question” to the internal history of the 
UN, it is nonetheless odd that the Charter of the UN—and the Statute of the International Court of Justice—were not 
officially published in Spain until 1990, with the publication of the Official State Gazette (BOE) containing the Unilateral 
Spanish Declaration of Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (BOE of November 
16, 1990). 
34  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was approved by the General Assembly via Resolution 217 (III), of 
December 10, 1948. Concerning the Declaration, its adoption, content and relevance cf. X. Pons Rafols (ed.), La Declaración 
Universal de Derechos Humanos. Comentario artículo por artículo (Icaria/ANUE, Barcelona, 1998), as well as J.A. Carrillo 
Salcedo, Dignidad frente a barbarie. La Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos (Trotta, Madrid, 1999). 
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rights organs, taking advantage of the democratizing process that had begun in our country with the 
adoption of the Constitution of 1978.35 Nevertheless, thirty years later, the renewed importance of 
Spain’s democratic transition in the context of the recuperation of historical memory —and the 
demands of justice and truth on the part of the victims— have cast this approach into doubt. In 
recent years, various organs that protect human rights within the UN system have called attention to 
Spain, claiming that it has not adequately responded to the violations of human rights committed 
during the civil war and the ensuing Francoist dictatorship.36 
 During the third stage, with the Constitution of 1978 fully in effect, Spain became a fully 
democratic State characterised by the rule of law, respectful towards and guarantor of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. In this context, and in a totally normalized manner, Spain signed onto 
almost all the UN treaties concerning human rights.37 This body of norms now forms part of internal 
Spanish law because of its reception through Article 96.1 of the Constitution and, therefore—whether 
they have a self-executing character or not—they are now Spanish law and the judges and courts must 
guarantee their application. If the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has clearly influenced the 
body of international laws in the matter of human rights, it has also had an enormous influence on the 
internal laws of member States and, in a special way, on Spanish constitutional law. Indeed, the 
catalogue of human rights and fundamental freedoms that our Constitution incorporates clearly has 
its source in the Universal Declaration, which is expressly mentioned in Article 10.2 of the 
Constitution.38 As a result, in addition to the internal application of the treaties concerning human 
rights, Spanish law recognizes the Universal Declaration and other international instruments in the 
matter of human rights as a reference for the application of the laws concerning the fundamental 
rights and freedoms that are recognized by the Constitution.39 
 The incorporation of Spain as a party to the treaties concerning human rights also meant that our 
country became subject to the mechanisms of conventional control, through the committees 
established for certain of these treaties. This has meant for Spain that it must provide information via 
periodic reports and analyses, together with the corresponding publishing of observations on Spain on 
                                                
35  Cf. the report on Spain in Document CCPR/C/4/Add.1, of September 8, 1978 and the Report of the Committee of 
Human Rights in the Document A/34/40 (Supplement no. 40). 
36  Considering it as damaging to the right to justice, the right to truth, the right to reparations and to guarantees of 
non-recurrence. This is what various Reports have stated in recent years (cf. for example, the Report of the Working Group 
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. Addition. Mission to Spain, Document A/HRC/27/49/Add.1, of July 2, 2014, 
and the Report of the Special Rapporteur for the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence. 
Mission to Spain, Document A/HRC/27/56/Add.1 22 of July, 2014).  An excellent analysis has been developed by R. Alija 
Fernández, “La transición española: una lectura desde la promoción y protección de los derechos humanos en la 
Organización de las Naciones Unidas”, in Las Naciones Unidas desde España,  at 619-634. 
37  With the exception of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, of December 18, 1990, which has still not been ratified by Spain. 
38  Which sets out that “Provisions relating to the fundamental rights and liberties recognised by the Constitution shall 
be construed in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international treaties and agreements 
thereon ratified by Spain”. 
39  Cf., in general and among other authors, D.J. Liñán Nogueras, “La aplicación en España de los tratados relativos a 
derechos y libertades fundamentales”, in A. Mangas Martín, Cuestiones prácticas de Derecho Internacional Público y 
cooperación jurídica internacional (Consejo General del Poder Judicial, Madrid 1994) 269-327. 
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the part of the organs for human rights of the UN system.40 Over the course of the years, this process 
has been highly positive for Spain, but there have also been certain negative aspects in the evaluations 
produced by the Committees concerning respect for and the evolution of human rights in Spain. 
Regarding the so-called special public procedures —such as extraconventional mechanisms for 
guaranteeing respect for human rights— I would like to emphasize that Spain was never the object of 
a special country-specific procedure, although it had been the object of thematic  procedures, 
prompting various visits to our country by the special rapporteurs on human rights.41 
 From an institutional point of view, the former Human Rights Commission42 only enjoyed the 
membership of Spain during three three-year periods, all from the democratic era in our country: 
1984-86, 1988-1990 and 2000-2002. Ever since the creation of the Human Rights Council in 2006, 
which took over from the former Commission —although the Council is now an organ that depends 
directly on the General Assembly itself— Spain has attempted to become a member of the new 
intergovernmental organ on two occasions (2008 and 2010); it achieved its goal during the period from 
2011-201343. In addition to the procedures already indicated, this Human Rights Council has the 
responsibility of carrying out a periodic examination —carried out by the States themselves, that is, 
between peers— about the compliance of the States with their obligations and commitments in the 
area of human rights, in order to guarantee the universality and equality of treatment amongst all the 
States. This procedure —called the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), which could have much more 
“teeth” than what it currently has in practice— is one that all member States of the UN and Spain 
have to undergo. In Spain’s case, it has had to pass this examination twice, first in May of 2010 and 
then in January of 2015.44 
 In sum, there is no doubt that Spain is today a democratic State that is respectful of human rights, 
to a great degree thanks to the effect that the UN system of human rights has had on internal law, as 
well as the European system of human rights. Focusing on just the UN system, it has been 
emphasized —in special procedures and in the observations of the various Committees regarding 
Spain’s reports— that the pompous rhetoric of certain public declarations contrasts, at times, with the 
reality of weaknesses and identified risks that go back years. These problems have been correctly 
diagnosed by the various human rights organs of the UN, but it continues to be difficult to 
incorporate the recommendations that proceed from those organs.45  
                                                
40  Cf., in general, above all, J. Bonet Pérez, “España ante los órganos de los tratados internacionales de derechos 
humanos de la ONU”, in Las Naciones Unidas desde España,  at 585-602. 
41  Cf. J. Saura Estapà, “España en el Consejo de Derechos Humanos: los mecanismos extraconvencionales de 
supervisión”, in Las Naciones Unidas desde España,  at 603-618. 
42 The organ for the promotion, stimulation and guarantee of human rights that was formerly dependent upon the 
Economic and Social Council. 
43  Cf. the report on the merits of Spain as a prospective member of the UN Human Rights Council in Document 
A/64/704, of March 15, 2010. 
44  Cf., in addition to the previously cited reference to J. Saura Estapà, “España en el Consejo de Derechos Humanos”, 
what was noted in X. Pons Rafols, “El examen periódico universal en materia de derechos humanos y el primer examen 
sobre España del año 2010”, 11 Agenda ONU (2009) 59-84. 
45  To cite just a single example, on various occasions beginning in 2000 the Human Rights Committee has demanded 
that Spain recognize the right to a higher review of criminal cases (Article 14.5 of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights). That is, the UN has denounced the fact that our legislation does not provide an effective procedure that would 
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SPAIN, THE UN AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES. 
The connection between Spain and the principle of self-determination of peoples must be understood 
from a double perspective. On the one hand, there is the good and the bad of the situation of the 
Spanish colonies in Africa, and their process of self-determination. On the other, Spain has mooted a 
standing claim, ever since its integration in the UN, to sovereignty over Gibraltar. In fact, the issue of 
decolonization was one of Spain’s hot topics in its relations with the UN during the entirety of the 
first stage of its participation, especially regarding the Spanish colonial territories of Sidi Ifni, 
Equatorial Guinea and Western Sahara.46 This last territory was the object of an Advisory Opinion of 
the International Court of Justice in 1975. As is known, in the context of the weakness that General 
Franco’s illness and death provoked, Spain abandoned its responsibilities to Western Sahara, in an 
ignominious act whose consequences for the Saharan people are still very much real. 
 Immediately after the admission of Spain, differences with certain other member States came to 
light, differences regarding the “legal condition” of certain African territories administered by Spain, 
but which were treated as overseas provinces. It was the same situation that Portugal found itself in 
but, in contrast with that country, Spain accepted collaboration with the UN in 1958, and eventually 
agreed to honour the conditions of Chapter XI of the Charter, a chapter dedicated to Non-Self-
Governing territories.47 Beginning in 1961, Spain began to provide information to the UN regarding 
the territories of Ifni, Fernando Póo, Rio Muni and Western (Spanish) Sahara. Beginning in 1965, the 
General Assembly adopted various resolutions, following the recommendations of the Special 
Committee (also called the Committee of 24) charged with examining the situation with a view to the 
application of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples,48 
reaffirming the right of the people of those territories to self-determination. The administrating 
power was asked to aid in the exercise of the self-determination of peoples. 
 Further, in Equatorial Guinea a weak regime of autonomy was established beginning in 1963, with 
the fusion of Fernando Póo and Río Muni into a single entity, which was accepted by the Guineans 
through a referendum. The exhortations of the international community and the formation of 
                                                                                                                                                            
permit a higher court to review a lower court’s condemnatory sentence, a requirement that has finally been made a part of 
our body of laws. 
46  Cf., in general, regarding Spanish decolonization from a historical perspective, the synthesis of J.B. Vilar Ramírez, 
“Franquismo y descolonización española en África”, 30 Historia Contemporánea (2005) 129-158.  
47  Distinguishing itself clearly from Portugal. This is why Resolution 1542 (XV) of the General Assembly, of December 
15, 1960, looked favourably upon the commitment expressed by Spain. At the same time it demanded from Portugal an 
identical commitment regarding a list of territories that the General Assembly considered to be non-self-governing 
territories, following Chapter XI of the Charter. 
48  Cf. for example, regarding Equatorial Guinea, the Resolutions of the General Assembly numbered 2067 (XX), of 
December 16, 1965; 2230 (XXI), of December 20, 1966; and 2355 (XXII) of December 19, 1967. In regards to Ifni and Spanish 
Sahara, two territories that have been conditioned by the Moroccan claims that were expressly mentioned in the 
corresponding resolutions of the General Assembly (with the postscript “in consultation with the Government of Morocco”); 
cf. Resolutions 2072 (XX), of December 16, 1965; 2229 (XXI), of December 20, 1966; 2354 (XXII), of December 19, 1967; and 
2428 (XXII), of December 18, 1968. Jaime de Piniés, Spain’s permanent representative before the UN between 1968-1972 and 
between 1973-1985, published in 2001 an exhaustive and complete analysis—with abundant detail—of the entire process of 
Spanish decolonization as it was lived in the debates and in the international diplomatic process of the UN (cf. J. De Piniés 
y Rubio, La descolonización española en las Naciones Unidas (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid 2001)). 
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political parties in Equatorial Guinea led to the adoption of a constitution in 1968, together with 
presidential and parliamentary elections that led to a declaration of independence on October 12, 1968; 
Equatorial Guinea was immediately admitted as a new member State of the UN. 49 
 In regards to Spain’s other territories, it will suffice to note that when in 1956 France and Spain—
with Spain being dragged along by France—conceded independence to Morocco, the decolonizing 
cycle was not by any means finished. Leaving aside the Moroccan claims to Ceuta and Melilla and 
other locations in Africa that were under Spanish sovereignty, the tensions with Morocco continued, 
first concerning Tarfaya and Ifni, and, at a second stage, Western Sahara. In the first phase, Morocco 
demanded the return of Tarfaya and Ifni, but the Spanish resistance to cede the southern zone of its 
former protectorate led to a war that was neither declared nor widely known, starting in October 1957 
and ending in April 1958, which ended without a unclear result and with the signing of the Treaty of 
Angra de Cintra in the same year. With these accords Spain ceded to Morocco the southern zone of 
its former protectorate, an area that had not been ceded with Morocco’s independence (Tarfaya), 
while retaining Ifni, even though its control of territory did not extend beyond the capital, Sidi Ifni. 
In the end, in accordance with the various Resolutions of the General Assembly I have mentioned, on 
June 30, 1969 Spain returned the territory of Sidi Ifni to Morocco via the Treaty of Fez, signed on 
January 4, 1969. 
 From that moment on, only Western Sahara would continue under Spanish administration, but 
with growing pressure from Morocco, which advertised its claims to the entire territory. The UN, for 
its part, continued to encourage Spain to decolonize the territory in consultation with the 
Governments of Morocco and Mauritania.50 Various negotiations and various changes to Spanish and 
Moroccan foreign policy led to a situation of maximum tension in 1975. As a preliminary matter, as I 
have already noted, the General Assembly had requested an advisory opinion from the International 
Court of Justice, regarding two questions: “Was Western Sahara (Rio del Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) 
at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?” and “What were 
the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?”51 In its 
advisory opinion, the Court declared first that Western Sahara was not terra nullius at the moment of 
its colonization and that the territory had at that moment certain legal links to both the Kingdom of 
Morocco and the Mauritanian entity, defined in the advisory opinion itself. Secondly, the Court 
declared that it did not recognize the existence of any legal links that would be, by their nature, 
capable of modifying the application of the principle of self-determination of peoples —as specified in 
Resolution 1514 (XV), of the General Assembly, of December 14, 1960— to the decolonization of 
Western Sahara.52 Even though a UN Mission —invited by the Spanish government— had visited the 
Sahara in May 1975, and Spain had fully accepted self-determination (although it was late to do so), 
                                                
49  Via Resolution 2384 (XXIII) of the General Assembly, of November 12, 1968. 
50  Cf. the Resolutions of the General Assembly numbered 2591 (XXIV), of December 16, 1969; 2711 (XXV), of December 
14, 1970; 2983 (XXVII), of December 14, 1972; 3162 (XXVIII), of December 14, 1973; 
51  Resolution 3292 (XXIX), of the General Assembly, December 13, 1974. 
52  Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12. Regarding the advisory opinion, cf. the analysis of J.A. 
Carrillo Salcedo, “Libre determinación de los pueblos e integridad territorial de los Estados en el Dictamen del Tribunal 
Internacional de Justicia sobre el Sáhara Occidental”, 29 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional (1976) 33-49. 
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the very ambiguity of the advisory opinion was used by Morocco to maintain its claims to that 
territory.53 
 In autumn of 1975 the Sahara question reached its most critical point, with the Green March —
under the impulse of Morocco— leading to the Tripartite Agreements of Madrid, of November 14, 
1975. These accords were negotiated in very difficult internal circumstances for Spain (because of 
Franco’s illness and his prolonged death throes), as well as a negative international situation (because 
of international disgust at the last executions under Francoism). By means of these Agreements, and 
paying no attention to the UN resolutions or Spain’s own promises to the Saharan people, the 
Spanish government handed over the territory in question to Morocco and Mauritania, thus 
relinquishing its international responsibilities as the administrative power.54 The Spanish withdrawal 
was complete by February of 1976 and, since then, the Sahara has been involved in a long war for 
national liberation, as well as a prolonged United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western 
Sahara (MINURSO), established with the yet unreached objective of guiding the process towards a 
referendum on self-determination.55 The situation continues to be genuinely blocked, and the Security 
Council has limited itself in recent years to renewing the MINURSO mandate, without any new 
initiatives or incorporating the dimension of human rights. Throughout these years Spain has been 
totally unable to adequately remedy the weakness and abandonment that resulted from the Madrid 
Agreements, even though it forms part—together with four of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council—of the Group of Friends of the Secretary General on the Sahara. As the 
administrative power for Western Sahara, Spain continues, in my opinion, to have an important 
responsibility towards the Sahauris. It must, in particular, aid in finding a solution that would 
unblock the process and facilitate, finally, the self-determination of Western Sahara.56 
 In the case of the permanent Spanish claim to Gibraltar within the framework of the UN, in 1946 
the United Kingdom stated that it considers Gibraltar to be a non-self-governing territory. As a result, 
in conformity with Article 73 of the Charter, the UK has provided information to the UN in its role 
as Gibraltar’s administrative power. In 1963, with Spain now a member State of the UN, and at the 
request of Cambodia and Bulgaria, the Committee for Decolonization —or Committee of the 24— 
decided to study the issue and proceeded to include Gibraltar in the list of territories to be 
decolonized. In 1964 this Committee reached the so-called “Consensus of 1964” which, taking account 
of the unusual situation of Gibraltar, held that decolonization ought to proceed via Spanish-British 
                                                
53  See, in general, the exhaustive work of F. Villar, El proceso de autodeterminación del Sáhara, ed. Fernando Torres SA, 
Valencia 1982 and the memoirs of F. Villar y Ortiz de Urbina, “Diplomático en las Naciones Unidas”, in España y la ONU,  
at 363-379, in particular in  at 363-368. 
54  In Resolution 3458 (XXX), of the General Assembly, of December 10, 1975, the request was again made that the 
administrative power meet its responsibilities by aiding in the exercise of the right to self-determination. The Madrid 
Agreements were noted, and all parties concerned were requested to respect the freely expressed aspirations of the Saharan 
people.  
55  Established in Resolution 690 (1991), of the Security Council, of April 29, 1991. 
56  Concerning the Sahara conflict from the Spanish point of view, and from the perspective of International Law, cf. e.g. 
A. Badia Martí, X. Fernández Pons & S. Carranza Förster (dirs.), La cuestión del Sáhara Occidental ante la Organización de 
las Naciones Unidas (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Madrid 1999) and J. Soroeta Liceras, El conflicto del Sáhara 
Occidental, reflejo de las contradicciones y carencias del Derecho Internacional (Servicio Editorial Universidad del País Vasco, 
Bilbao, 2001). 
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negotiations, keeping in mind the interests of the inhabitants of the territory. This consensus was 
accepted by the General Assembly through Resolution 2070 (XX), of December 16, 1965, with the 
support of Spain and the UK.57 However, this latter country, rather than continue the negotiations, 
chose to follow its own path towards self-determination, organizing a referendum on Gibraltar in 1967, 
in which 99% of the voters expressed the desire to continue under British sovereignty. 
 Although the Resolutions of the General Assembly were positive for Spanish interests, the 
Resolution that was the most favourable for the Spanish position was 2353 (XXII), of December 19, 
1967, wherein the General Assembly lamented the breakdown of negotiations and condemned the 
referendum. Further, in the preamble, it held that “any colonial situation which partially or completely 
destroys the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”. For Spain the key point was that the territory is 
a colonial territory but, exceptionally, the right of self-determination did not apply due to the 
controversy over sovereignty, and its decolonization had to come about via negotiations between the 
two States.58 Despite the fact that the Spanish position was widely supported within the UN itself, 
the UK, nevertheless, continued with its own policies, which would result in the promulgation in 1969 
of a Constitution for Gibraltar, while Spain had taken the measure of closing the border fence as a 
means of exerting pressure on the UK.  
 In 1973 a new consensus was adopted in the General Assembly, demanding, once again, bilateral 
negotiations for the decolonization of Gibraltar, requiring the two governments to inform the 
Committee of 24 of the results of these negotiations.59 Since 1974 the General Assembly has not 
adopted by vote any decision about Gibraltar, and has only adopted generic decisions. Furthermore, 
negotiations have been underway between Spain and the United Kingdom since 1980, a process that 
has gone through various stages, including the Process of Brussels, the Tripartite Forum for Dialogue 
and new instruments of local cooperation, with the UN limiting itself to taking note of these 
processes. In any case, the position maintained by the UN for more than 50 years constitutes an 
important asset for Spain, despite the fact that a definitive solution to the Gibraltar problem can only 
come about—as the General Assembly has repeatedly insisted—via negotiations between the two 
governments. 
THE PARTICIPATION OF SPAIN IN THE UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
It is well known that the principal goal of the UN is the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and the other activities of the international organization must be somehow linked to that 
fundamental aim. In the final Document of the World Summit in 2005 this focus was reiterated with 
a inseparable triad of objectives: “that peace and security, development and human rights are the 
                                                
57  Just as would occur with Resolution 2231 (XXI) of the General Assembly, of December 20, 1966. 
58  Among the abundant bibliography about Spain and the Gibraltar issue, it is interesting to see how the problem has 
been viewed by the UN, as recounted in A. del Valle Galvez, “Gibraltar en las resoluciones y decisiones de la Asamblea 
General de la ONU, 1965-2015. Algunas valoraciones” in Las Naciones Unidas desde España,  at 501-517. 
59  Cf. Resolutions 3163 (XXVIII), December 14, 1973 and 3286 (XXIX), of December 13, 1974, both passed by the 
General Assembly. 
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pillars of the United Nations system and the foundations for collective security and well-being,” and 
that these three elements “are interlinked and mutually reinforcing”.60 Spain, as a member State of the 
UN, shares and participates fully in this holistic perspective, although all are aware of the centrality of 
peacekeeping and the privileged position of responsibility that corresponds to the Security Council. 
Thus, it should be valued just as Spain’s participation as a non-permanent member of that Council 
has been valued. Whether or not Spain is actively working as a member of the Security Council, our 
country has supported the peacekeeping activities of the UN since its entry into the UN. This 
includes its financial contribution to the special account for peacekeeping operations; its presence on 
the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations between 1964-1970, between 1974-2001, and since 
2006; its active and more recent participation in the Group of Friends of Mediation61; and, to note a 
final action, supporting the review process for Resolution 1325 (2000), of the Security Council, 
concerning Women, Peace and Security. This has led to the unanimous adoption of Resolution 224 
(2015), of the Security Council, of October 13, 2015, an occasion when Spain was holding the rotating 
presidency of this Council. 
 What I would like to focus on now is our country’s direct contributions of military and police 
forces, which have involved the provision of more than 140,000 men and women of the Armed Forces 
and of the Security Corps and Forces.62 This participation, over the course of more than 25 years, has 
also involved an important level of military and financial commitment by Spain and, above all, a 
notable cost in human lives at the service of the UN. Since 1989 nearly 200 members of our Armed 
Forces and Security Corps have died on UN missions, the majority of them victims of accidents. 
This participation has also turned Spain into a more relevant and influential actor, which in turn has 
also meant greater responsibility, such as that of being a non-permanent member of the Security 
Council. 
 But in addition to what these contributions, presence and influence have meant for our country —
generating a new reputation and image for Spain on the international scene— I believe another 
internal element of great importance should also be mentioned. I believe that the participation of the 
Spanish Armed Forces in international missions has contributed positively to the extraordinary 
improvement in the image of the Armed Forces among Spaniards. Three or four decades ago they 
were still seen as holdovers of Francoism.63 This improvement in the image of our Armed Forces has 
                                                
60  Final Document of the World Summit 2005, Resolution 60/1, of the General Assembly, of September 15, 2005, para. 9. 
61  In a special way with the Spanish-Moroccan initiative for mediation in the Mediterranean, the first demonstration at 
the regional level of Resolution 65/285, of the General Assembly, of June 22, 2011, which exhorted the States to increase their 
capacity for mediation. 
62  For a general perspective on these issues, cf. I.C. Marrero Rocha, La participación de las Fuerzas Armadas españolas en 
misiones de paz (Plaza y Janés, Madrid, 2007); P.A. Fernández Sánchez, “La participación de España en las operaciones de 
mantenimiento de la paz de las Naciones Unidas: balance y perspectivas”, in Las Naciones Unidas desde España, at 521-538; as 
well as F.J. Zorzo Ferrer, “Mis experiencias profesionales en las Naciones Unidas”, in España y la ONU, at 283-315. 
63  In fact, there are those who hold that the Spanish participation in peacekeeping operations has marked an end to a 
“military transition” that lasted longer than the democratic transition in Spain [cf. C. Navajas Zubeldia, “El inicio de las 
Operaciones de la Paz como ‘punto final’ de la larga transición militar”, in I. Sepúlveda (ed.), España en las operaciones 
internacionales de pacificación (Instituto Universitario Gutiérrez Mellado – UNED, Madrid 2009)]. Concerning public 
opinion about Spain’s participation in peacekeeping missions cf. F. Arteaga, “Opinión pública española y misiones 
internacionales”, in I. Sepúlveda (ed.), España en las operaciones internacionales …, at 161-178. 
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followed on their internationalization, as they share missions with military contingents from many 
other countries —seeing themselves as mirrored in the eyes of others— which has made them much 
more professional and modernized. 
 The first mission that featured Spanish boots on the ground was in 1988, with the sending, at the 
request of the General Secretary, of seven military observers to Angola to join UNAVEM I.64 This 
initial, limited participation would continue in 1989 —with the participation of a larger number of 
soldiers— in the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) established to assure the 
independence of Namibia. Immediately thereafter, also in 1989, Spain joined the United Nations 
Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). In this latter mission, dealing as it did with countries 
of Central America, the Spanish presence had an obvious additional component, and it was also the 
first occasion on which an international mission of the UN was headed by a Spanish general.65 
Beginning with these first missions Spain has participated in many others: our country has 
participated in nearly 30 UN peacekeeping missions. The mission that had the greatest Spanish 
participation was that of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). This mission also 
featured a Spanish general acting as Commander in Chief of the Mission and Special Representative 
of the General Secretary between 2010 and 2012.66 Apart from the Armed Forces, beginning in 1991 
with the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), Spain’s Civil Guard has also 
joined the military and police contingents on UN missions. In addition, the National Police Corps 
has carried out policing functions as well as police training on numerous missions.67 
 Various initiatives have arisen in order to reinforce the capacity of the UN for maintaining the 
peace. Given that the agreements foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter were never approved, these 
initiatives place military forces at the disposition of the UN in a stand-by posture. The purpose is to 
alleviate those weaknesses and overcome the voluntary, case-by-case makeup of the military 
contingents of these missions, thereby making the activation of a given mission more agile. With the 
end of the Cold War, and the new peace initiative that Secretary General Boutros Ghali proposed,68 
the Security Council ended up supporting a system of reserve capacity that the member States could 
maintain in a state of full readiness, as a potential contribution to peacekeeping operations. Spain was 
one of the first member States of the UN to confirm their willingness to contribute those reserve 
capacities. In November of 1999 the UN and Spain formalized the corresponding Memorandum of 
                                                
64  United Nations Angola Verification Mission I, established in 1988 to verify the departure of Cuban troops from the 
territory of Angola. 
65  Cf. A. Quesada Gómez, “España en las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz: Centroamérica y Nicaragua. 
ONUCA”, in España y la ONU, at 253-267. 
66  General Alberto Asarta Cuevas (for a discussion of his contribution, cf. A. Asarta Cuevas, “UNIFIL, trabajando por 
la paz en Oriente Medio”, in Las Naciones Unidas desde España, at 547-559).  
67  Cf. M. López Corral, “La Guardia Civil en las Misiones Internacionales de Paz”, in I. Sepúlveda (ed.), España en las 
operaciones internacionales …, at 119-143, in particular 128 ff. 
68  Basically in its Report An Agenda of Peace. Preventive diplomacy, the establishment of peace and maintaining peace, 
Document A/47/277-S/24111, of June 17, 1992. 
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Understanding (MOU) about Spain’s contributions to the system of agreements regarding United 
Nations standing reserve forces.69 
 Apart from Spain’s financial contribution and, especially, the contribution of members of the 
Armed Forces and Security Corps and Forces to peacekeeping operations, I believe that our country’s 
logistical contribution should also be noted. For instance, there is the construction and handing over 
to the UN of the UN Communications Centre —as a support base for peacekeeping operations and 
related operations of the UN— which, since 2011, has been functioning in Quart de Poblet, next to 
the Valencia airport.70 On January 28, 2009, the UN and Spain signed an Agreement regarding the 
UN’s use of facilities on Spanish territory for the provision of communications services to 
peacekeeping and related operations of the UN. These facilities were to act as a complementary centre 
to the one the UN already had in Brindisi.71   
 Finally, as a consequence of the political fracture that resulted from Spain’s participation in the 
war and later occupation of Iraq, and the immediate decision of the socialist Government in 2004 to 
remove the Spanish troops, a reform of Spanish legislation on defence was mooted in 2005. The new 
legislation would place emphasis on the conditions and the authorization procedure required for the 
participation of Spain’s Armed Forces in missions abroad. The Organic Law 5/2005, of November 17, 
of National Defense (LODN),72 establishes, on the one hand, that any participation of the Spanish 
Armed Forces in international missions, or any increase in the military contingents already 
participating —whether it be a UN peacekeeping operation, or an operation under the aegis of 
NATO or the EU— there must be a prior authorization by the Congress of Deputies. In addition, 
out of respect for international law, the LODN establishes three cumulative conditions that we can 
term the condition of origin, the condition of finality and the condition of conformity with 
International Law.73 
                                                
69  Cf. above all X. Pons Rafols, “La participación de España en el sistema de acuerdos de fuerzas de reserva para las 
operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz”, 2 Agenda ONU (1999) 123-164. 
70  On a different topic, Spain’s agreement with the World Food Programme (WFP) should be highlighted: it called for 
the establishment of a Distribution Centre for European humanitarian aid in Puerto de la Luz of Las Palmas, in Gran 
Canaria. 
71  BOE of December 21, 2009. 
72  BOE of November 18, 2005. 
73  The following conditions were laid down in Article 19 of the Organic Law of National Defense (LODN in Spanish): 
the missions must either be expressly requested by the Government in whose territories they will be stationed; or they may 
be authorized by Resolutions of the UN Security Council; or they can be agreed upon by the international organizations 
that Spain is part of, in particular the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), within the 
framework of their respective capacities. The missions must be defensive, humanitarian and have the aim of stabilization or 
keeping of the peace and they must be planned and ordered by the UN, the EU or NATO. Finally, the missions must be in 
accordance with the UN Charter and they may not contradict or harm the principles of international law that Spain has 
integrated into its own body of law, in conformity with article 96.1 of the Constitution. Cf. a commentary on these 
requirements of the LODN from a legal perspective in X. Pons Rafols, “El Derecho Internacional, la Constitución española 
y la Ley Orgánica de la Defensa Nacional”, in H. Torroja Mateu (dir.) & S. Güell Peris (coord.), Los retos de la seguridad y 
defensa en el nuevo contexto internacional (Publicaciones i Edicions UB, Barcelona 2007) 229-257. 
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THE UN, SPAIN, THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND THE PROGRESSIVE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS CODIFICATION 
From a more legal perspective and, in particular, from the position of International Law, I believe that 
the presence and integration of Spain in the UN can be measured on three axes. First, there is an axis 
relating to participation in the great multilateral treaties adopted within the framework of the UN 
and, in particular, taking on the driving role in some of them. Secondly, there is an axis concerning 
Spain’s litigiousness in the International Court of Justice, and the presence of Spanish judges on the 
benches of this principal judicial organ of the UN. These are aspects that have been analysed in our 
country by the man who was the Registrar of the Court between 1980 and 1986: the Spaniard Santiago 
Torres Bernárdez.74 Thirdly, there is the axis of the presence and contributions of Spanish citizens on 
the International Law Commission, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly that has been charged 
with aiding the Assembly in the progressive development of International Law and its codification.  
 Regarding the first axis, over the years Spain has been integrating itself into the multilateral law 
scene, participating in the negotiations and ratification of the principal international treaties adopted 
in the framework of the UN. Aside from the human rights treaties I’ve already mentioned, Spain has 
followed the same path in many other areas, including diplomatic and consular relations, the law of 
the sea, the law of treaties and the entire sector of International Law related to the environment. All 
of these treaties have been integrated into our national law, establishing rights and obligations of 
International Law. Spain follows this law internationally, in virtue of the principle of good faith; in 
addition, Spain participates in the international negotiations that have led to the adoption of those 
treaties.  
 It is not just a question of Spain’s participation —through its representatives in these international 
Conferences— in the negotiation, adoption and authentication of international multilateral treaties, 
later incorporating them into its national law. In addition, our country has played an especially 
relevant role in seeking consensus and in the facilitation of the negotiations between the States 
involved.75 As an illustrative example of this work, there is the “consolidated” text that the Preparatory 
Committee of the Diplomatic Conference of Rome of 1988 prepared. In turn, this Conference 
adopted the Rome Statute, thereby establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC). This 
consolidated text was far from being fully agreed-upon, and the negotiations between the States 
participating in the Conference were key to its success, helping in the resolution of both the legal 
complications as well as certain political issues. This is why, both during the preparatory phase as well 
as in the negotiation process at the Diplomatic Conference, above and beyond the active presence of 
the NGOs, the so-called “like-minded countries” played a relevant role, and became a genuine driving 
force in drawing up the Rome Statute. Spain was clearly present in this group of countries, a majority 
of them Western, although certain African and Ibero-American countries and other regions were 
                                                
74  Cf. S. Torres Bernárdez, “La contribución española al establecimiento y desarrollo del arreglo judicial de las 
controversias internacionales por la Corte Internacional de Justicia”, in España y la ONU, at 207-249. 
75  For example, Spain’s participation in the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties stood out, according to S. Torres 
Bernárdez, ibid. at 232. 
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present.76 This Spanish aid to the creation of the ICC and, in general, universal criminal jurisdiction, 
was preceded by the active assistance of Spain —which was then a non-permanent member of the 
Security Council— with the creation of the ad hoc courts for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. 
Regarding international litigiousness before the International Court of Justice —there was very little, 
in general terms— I would like to note, initially, that when Spain was admitted to the UN in 1955, it 
also acquired ipso facto —as specified in Article 93 of the Charter— the status of a participating State 
in the Statute of the Court. Shortly after its admission to the UN, Spain faced its first lawsuit before 
the Court. The lawsuit started with the issue of the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company 
Limited, a Canadian company with Belgian capital that had been declared bankrupt by a court in Reus 
(Tarragona province), which ordered an embargo of its assets and those of its subsidiaries. New stocks 
of the subsidiaries were sold to a new company, Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña (FECSA), which 
consequently ended up with total control of Barcelona Traction in Spain. In addition to the long 
internal legal process, a first Belgian lawsuit before the ICJ in 1958 was withdrawn by the Belgian 
government, in the hopes that negotiations between the two governments would prove fruitful. When 
those negotiations failed, Belgium presented a new request before the Court in 1962, this time 
regarding reparation for the damages suffered by the Belgian shareholders of the company. The ad hoc 
judge for this lawsuit, as designated by Spain, was an Uruguayan named Enrique C. Armand-Ugon. 
The Court dictated an initial judgment regarding preliminary exceptions, rejecting some of the 
exceptions presented by Spain.77 Finally, in 1970 the Court dictated its judgment on the issue.78 In 
that decision, the Court, without entering in depth into the case, ruled that Belgium lacked the 
necessary ius standi for providing diplomatic protection to the Belgian shareholders of a Canadian 
company regarding the measures adopted against that company in Spain. International law, except in 
special circumstances that were not in play here, recognizes that only the Government of the 
company’s nationality has the right to provide diplomatic protection.79 
 Another more recent issue was the lawsuit initiated in 1995, whereby Spain sued Canada over 
jurisdiction in the matter of fisheries. The suit denounced the relevant Canadian law and, in 
particular, the concrete measures adopted in the execution of that law on March 9, 1995. These 
measures, as applied in the case at hand, included the chase, boarding and confiscation on the high 
seas of a fishing vessel, the Estai, which was cruising under the flag of Spain, fishing Greenland 
halibut in the zone regulated by the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). In this case the 
Court did not enter into the deeper issues in play, given that its 1998 judgment declared that it did 
not have competence to emit a ruling concerning the case. The basis of this pronouncement resided in 
the content of the reserve formulated by Canada in its optional clause, declaring its acceptance of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court: the controversies arising out of or concerning conservation and 
                                                
76  Cf. the commentary on the work of this group in J.A. Yáñez-Barnuevo, “La Conferencia de Roma y el Estatuto de la 
Corte Penal Internacional: balance y perspectivas”, in F.J. Quel López, Creación de una jurisdicción penal internacional 
(Colección Escuela Diplomática Nº 4, AEPDIR, Madrid 2000) at 23. 
77  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1964, p. 6.  
78  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3. 
79  Cf. In regards to the case of Barcelona Traction, cf. the issue of 23 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional (1970), 
dedicated exclusively to the subject and to the judgment of the International Justice Court. 
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management measures taken by Canada with respect to vessels fishing in the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization’s Regulatory Area were excluded from its competence, as was the enforcement 
of such measures.80 
 There was a third issue before the International Court of Justice, in which Spain was the subject of 
a lawsuit brought by Yugoslavia in 1999 against it and nine other States that were members of the 
North Altantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), for violation of the obligation to not use force; these 
NATO members were claimed to have bombed Yugoslavian territory in an operation stemming from 
the Kosovo conflict. The Court decided that in this case as well it was not competent to enter into 
the issues in depth, due to the formal reason that Spain, in accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court, did so in regards to those controversies where the other part had also accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction, with at least twelve months of anticipation prior to the formulation of the lawsuit. In 
this case, Yugoslavia had recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court three days before 
formulating the lawsuit against Spain and the other NATO Member States.81 
 In addition to the issues that Spain was involved in directly, I believe that we should emphasize 
Spanish contributions to other issues brought before the Court, especially in regards to two advisory 
opinions and the clear Spanish position of promoting respect for International Law. I refer, on the 
one hand, to the already-cited Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, an issue for which Spain 
formulated a number of allegations, some of them handled by eminent specialists in International 
Law.82 On the other hand, I hold that we should emphasize both the written declaration as well as the 
oral declaration —both formulated by Spain— concerning the Advisory Opinion of 2010, about the 
concordance of International Law with the unilateral declaration of independence by the provisional 
institutions of self-government in Kosovo.83 
 Regarding the presence of Spanish magistrates on the International Court of Justice, the initial 
issue to emphasize is that in Spain’s sixty years as a UN member there has been only one occasion 
when a Spaniard has served for a full period of nine years as a judge of the Court. This was Federico 
de Castro y Bravo, who was a member of the Court during the years 1970-1979.84 Ad hoc judges have 
been designated for issues that Spain had been involved in. These judges include the Spanish jurist 
and former Registrar of the ICJ Santiago Torres Bernárdez, both for the issue of jurisdiction in the 
matter of fisheries (Spain v. Canada) and for the issue of the legality of the use of force (Yugoslavia v. 
Spain), although in both issues the Court eventually declared itself non-competent. Spanish ad hoc 
judges have been appointed for other processes in which Spain has not been a party, but only Federico 
de Castro occupied the position in the ICJ in accordance with its Statute.85 This adds up to a presence 
                                                
80  Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1998, p. 432. Concerning this 
issue, cf. also the articles in a monographic section of the 51 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional (1999) at 89-161. 
81  Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), Provisional Measures, Order of June 2, 1999, ICJ Reports 1999, p. 761. 
82  For example, José M. Lacleta Muñoz, Santiago Martínez Caro, Fernando Arias-Salgado and Julio D. González 
Campos. 
83  Both declarations were reproduced in the 63 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional (2011) 199-272. 
84  Only one Spaniard served the former Permanent Court of International Justice as a judge: Rafael de Altamira Crevea, 
from 1922 to 1939, although the outbreak of World War II meant that he continued to serve until 1946.  
85  Concerning the election of Federico de Castro and his work as a judge of the ICJ cf. X. Pons Rafols, “Federico de 
Castro: único miembro español de la Corte Internacional de Justicia”, 10 Agenda ONU (2009) 75-105. 
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that, in my opinion, is clearly insufficient. Spain has sought to revert without attaining the 
designation of a Spaniard as judge, being unable to obtain an absolute majority of votes in the 
General Assembly and in the Security Council86. 
 The first issue to emphasize about the International Law Commission (ILC)87 is that it is made up 
of persons of “recognized competence in international law”, who are chosen by the General Assembly 
for a period of five years, with the possibility of renewal. These are people who have been designated 
as individuals and not as representatives of States. The requirements for selection involve maintaining 
an equitable geographical representation, as well as assuring that there are never two members of the 
same nationality serving at once. Even with these conditioning factors, I believe that the participation 
of Spaniards on the ILC has been unjustifiably reduced in comparison with other countries of the 
same regional group, or in comparison with other countries admitted to the UN at the same time that 
Spain was. Indeed, I claim that the present situation is absolutely unjustifiable, given the scientific 
level and skill of Spanish specialists in International Law.88 In these sixty years only three Spaniards 
have been elected as members of the ILC, and up to now none have had their terms renewed. These 
are Antonio de Luna García, who served from 1962 to 196689; José Manuel Lacleta Muñoz, who was a 
member from 1982 to 198690; and, finally, Concepción Escobar Hernández, who has been a member of 
the ILC since 2011. 91  Further, neither Luna Garcia nor Lacleta Muñoz were designed special 
rapporteurs for the ILC about any of the various topics that Commission deal. Concepción Escobar, 
at least, is acting as a special rapporteur for the topic of “Immunity of State officials from foreign 
criminal jurisdiction” and so far has presented four Reports with proposals for articles.92 
SOME INITIATIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS THAT ARE LEGALLY OR POLITICALLY RELEVANT 
Spain’s belonging to the UN or any other intergovernmental organization, as Javier Roldán has noted, 
“confers on it a power —variable and not without conditioning factors— over the functioning of that 
organization”93 and, in general, over its political orientations. As I indicated at the beginning of this 
study, my objective has merely been to write a summary, and over the course of the preceding pages I 
have presented various aspects of the Spanish contribution. We play a role and exercise an influence 
that must —since 1986 and, in particular, since 1992, with the creation of the European Union and the 
                                                
86  In 2005, there was a possibility that Prof. Julio D. González Campos would be elected, but in the end he was not.  
87  The Statute of the International Law Commission was approved by Resolution 174 (II) of the General Assembly, of 
November 21, 1947.  Its initial makeup of 15 members was progressively expanded, until it reached the current level of 34. 
88  Cf. in this regard X. Pons Rafols, “España en la Comisión de Derecho Internacional: balance a los cincuenta años de 
su creación”, 1 Agenda ONU (1998) 149-164. 
89  Cf. E. Pérez Vera, “La labor del profesor de Luna como miembro de la Comisión de Derecho Internacional”, 21 
Revista Española de Derecho Internacional (1968) 208-226. 
90  Cf. J.M. Lacleta Muñoz, “Las Naciones Unidas en mi vida profesional”, in España y la ONU,  at 349-353. 
91  Prof. Escobar was initially elected a member of the Commission on April 23, 2011, in order to occupy the vacant 
position produced by the death of Paula Escarameia, of Portuguese nationality. On November 17, 2011, Escobar was chosen 
as a member, along with the rest of the ILC, for the period 2012-2016. 
92  Cf. the four Reports on this issue presented by the Special Rapporteur in Documents A/CN.4/654, A/CN.4/661, 
A/CN.4/673 and A/CN.4/686, submitted to the Commission in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively. 
93  Cf. J. Roldán Barbero, Las relaciones exteriores de España (Dykinson, Madrid 2001), at 96. 
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pillar of Common Foreign and Security Policy— be employed in agreement and in coordination with 
the other members of the EU.94 In this last section I will mention three legal-political issues that I 
deem relevant: first, the proposals for the reform of the UN and in particular the reform of the 
Security Council; second, the fight against international terrorism; and third, the initiative that 
created the Alliance of Civilizations, taken up by the UN.  
 Over the years, Spain has supported a number of proposals for the reform of the UN,95 although it 
is well known that the process of reform has not advanced significantly: it always gets bogged down in 
the reform of the Security Council. One of the few reforms of the Charter that have been successful 
concerned the Security Council: its membership was increased from 11 States to 15 in 1963.96 As a 
result, the number of non-permanent members rose from 6 to 10, while the five permanent members 
were retained. The composition of the Security Council and the right to veto —restricted to the 
permanent members— were criticized right from the moment of creation of the UN. Today the 
current configuration has become obsolete and no longer reflects the developments experienced by the 
international community since 1945. Nobody denies that the Security Council’s present-day 
composition is far from satisfying the demands of the rest of the current 193 UN Member States. In 
addition, for more than 20 years there has been a certain general consensus that it does indeed need 
reform, for instance by increasing it from 15 to 24 or 25 Member States, so that it would have a more 
equitable representation. Nonetheless, after long debates and negotiations, and despite an agreement 
about the diagnosis, there is still no concrete agreement about how the reform should take place. 
 A reform of the Council, which would imply reforming the Charter, requires an affirmative vote 
from two thirds of the UN members. For it to entry into force, however, whether achieved via the 
path of Article 108 or else the path of Article 109 of the Charter, it must be ratified by two thirds of 
the Member States, including the five permanent members of the Security Council. There must 
therefore be a broad consensus among member States, as well as the commitment of the permanent 
members of the Security Council. Among the various proposals for the reform of the Security 
Council, there are different positions taken by groups of States, which follow from their specific 
interests or regional character. 
 Spain forms part of the group Uniting for Consensus97 that proposes an expansion to 25 or 26 
members, but only in the category of non-permanent members; in addition, the time in office of the 
more relevant non-permanent members would be extended to more than the two years currently 
provided for. Under this proposal, the non-permanent member States of the Security Council would 
be eligible for immediate re-election; that is, they would be elected more frequently and for more time, 
thus granting a kind of semi-permanent membership, albeit without the right to veto. The group also 
                                                
94  A coordination that is referred to expressly by Article 34 of the Treaty of the European Union. 
95  Although it is from 1995, see X. Pons Rafols, A. Olesti Rayo & H. Torroja Mateu, “La reforma de la Carta de las 
Naciones Unidas. Informe analítico de la práctica de la Organización”, in Jornadas sobre el cincuenta aniversario de las 
Naciones Unidas (Colección Escuela Diplomática, Madrid, 1995) 79-115. 
96  Via the reform that took place on the basis of Article 108 of the Charter, and laid out in Resolution 1991 (XVIII), of 
the General Assembly, of December 17, 1963. 
97  Spain is in a group with 11 other countries: Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Italy, San Marino, Malta, 
Turkey, Pakistan, South Korea and Canada. 
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supports the elimination of the veto, or at least a rule that restricts its use; further, it seeks a more 
equitable representation on the Council, with non-permanent members from Africa, Latin America, 
the Caribbean and Asia. While waiting for a reform to the Security Council along formal channels, 
Spain and the group Uniting for Consensus also seek to modify a number of aspects of the 
functioning of the Security Council, in order to make it more transparent and attentive to the 
concerns of the other member States. Thus, representation would be linked to efficacy, transparency, 
legitimacy and the responsibility of the Council. Another path is that of the Arria-Formula meetings, 
which would permit the participation in the Security Council of other persons not strictly 
representative of the member States, thereby achieving higher levels of openness and participation.  
 Spain is very sensitive to the need to struggle against international terrorism, having been affected 
by terrorist acts ever since the 1960s. It has constantly supported the actions of the UN and has 
fostered international cooperation in the fight against international terrorism, in both the General 
Assembly and in the Security Council. In the General Assembly, the topic became a concern 
beginning in the 1970s,98 when it adopted a number of declarations for the elimination of international 
terrorism.99 In 2006 —with the support of Spain— the General Assembly adopted the important 
document “UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”.100 In the framework of this Strategy, Spain 
contributed actively to the funding of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) 
and, in particular, to the Working Group on Supporting and Highlighting Victims of Terrorism. For 
its part, the Security Council is also concerned about international terrorism, which has increased in 
an exponential manner beginning with the end of the Cold War101 and, especially, with the attack on 
the Twin Towers in New York on September 11, 2001. In response, the Council created a Counter-
Terrorism Committee,102 which gained new life in 2004 with the assistance of a Counter-Terrorism 
Committee Executive Directorate,103 which was initially occupied by a Spanish diplomat.104 
 When the brutal attacks took place in Madrid on March 11, 2004, the Security Council responded 
forcefully the same day, approving a Resolution of condemnation, Resolution 1530 (2004), of March 11, 
2004, in which it expressed its “reinforced determination to combat all forms of terrorism, in 
accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations”. Initially there were 
attempts to exploit the attacks for political gain, which meant that in the Resolution itself the attacks 
were initially laid at the feet of ETA. A few days on, the permanent representative of Spain at the UN 
brought a letter to the President of the Security Council noting that other lines of investigation had 
                                                
98  Cf. for example, V. Abellán Honrubia, “El terrorismo internacional”, 28 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional 
(1975) 33-56. 
99 Such as the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism adopted in 1994 via Resolution 49/60, of 
the General Assembly, of December 9, 1994, and the complementary Declaration adopted in 1996 via Resolution 51/210, of 
December 17, 1996. 
100  Resolution 60/288, of the General Assembly, of September 8, 2006. 
101  For example, Resolution 1267 (1999), of the Security Council, of December 15, 1999, which created Committee 1267, 
for supervising the application of international sanctions to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 
102 Resolution 1373 (2001), of the Security Council, of September 28, 2001. 
103  Resolution 1535 (2004), of the Security Council, of March 26, 2004. 
104  The ambassador Javier Rupérez (cf. his approach to the topic in J. Rupérez, “La definición del terrorismo y las 
Naciones Unidas: una historia interminable”, in Las Naciones Unidas desde España, at 247-262). 
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been opened. Two weeks later another letter was submitted, concluding that the attacks had been 
committed by a radical Islamic group.105 
 The final perspective I would like to emphasize has to do with Spain’s continued action against 
international terrorism, concerning the impetus that it has brought to its current role as a non-
permanent member of the Security Council. Thus, for example, in July of 2015 Spain convoked a 
special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council, related to the 
“Stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters”. It also continued with its work of supporting the 
victims of terrorism, in accordance with the High-Level Conference on Victims of Terrorism in 2012, 
acting as the protagonist in drafting a Statute for the victims. To that end, under a Spanish 
presidency of the Security Council, an informal Arria-Formula meeting of the Council was held this 
past October 21 of 2015, with the participation of the victims of terrorism. Finally, I would like to note 
the still-nascent Hispano-Rumana initiative for creating an International Court to combat terrorism, 
an initiative that is currently the object of preliminary diplomatic conversations. 
 In order to finish this section, I turn briefly to the Spanish initiative named Alliance of 
Civilizations. This initiative was proposed in 2004 by the then-President of the Government, José 
Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, before the General Assembly. Its aim was to literally create an alliance of 
civilizations between the Western world and the Arab and Muslim world.106 The following year, the 
then-Secretary General Kofi Annan formally launched the Alliance of Civilizations as an initiative of 
the UN, with the sponsorship of Spain and Turkey; later, he also named a High Representative. The 
Alliance aims to foment understanding and cooperative relations among States and peoples, between 
cultures and religions; further, it seeks to counter the forces that fuel polarization and extremism. The 
General Assembly supported all these initiatives in 2009 107  and, since then, the Alliance of 
Civilizations has continued its work with meetings of the Group of Friends of the Alliance, and with 
periodic Forums and Conferences. The Alliance has become more concrete with the development of 
numerous projects and initiatives related to youth, education, the communications media, migrations, 
intercultural dialogue and innovation. 
FINAL REMARKS 
As I indicated at the beginning of this article, my intention has been to lay out a general summary of 
what, for our country and for the UN itself, our sixty years of UN membership have meant. This 
panorama has necessarily been general; I assume responsibility for leaving out many other aspects of 
importance to the UN/Spain relationship, which could have been highlighted but were not. To have 
analysed all the many aspects of Spain’s relationship the UN would have required an extensive 
analytic review, both of the enormous work of the UN as well as the diplomatic correspondence of 
                                                
105  Cf. the letters, respectively, in Document S/2004/204, of March 15, 2004 and in Document S/2004/269, of March 31, 
2004. 
106  In his speech during the general debate of the forty-ninth period of sessions of the General Assembly (cf. the minutes 
of the session on September 21, 2004, Document A/59/PV.4). 
107  By means of Resolution 64/14, of the General Assembly, of November 10, 2009. 
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Spain’s permanent Mission to the UN. As I have already noted, a number of Spanish diplomats have 
prepared memoirs of this type with a focus on a specific period or matter. Nonetheless, given the 
nature of this contribution I have chosen to develop a broad, diachronic perspective that touches on 
the diverse aspects that have seemed most relevant to me. This perspective largely begins, albeit not 
exclusively, with the point of view of Public International Law. 
 My firm conviction is that the UN is a useful and valuable instrument which should be 
strengthened, although it must adapt itself to the interconnected dangers, needs and challenges facing 
international society in the 21st century. This will inevitably require the political will of the member 
States. Even with all the weaknesses, restrictions and contradictions that plague the UN, and the 
lights and shadows of Spanish participation —in particular the limitations of the first of the three 
stages I have delimited— I have no doubts about the extraordinary strengths of the UN, about the 
continued validity of its purposes and principles, or about Spain’s firm commitment to the UN. In 
the second, and especially in the third stage that I have defined, Spain has committed itself intensely 
to international peace and security, with an emphasis on sustainable development and the promotion 
of human rights, the three essential pillars of the UN system. Spain has done this, in my judgment, 
out of a deep conviction that multilateralism —represented by the UN— constitutes the only possible 
path by which the international community can overcome its impotence and actively face the 
challenges of the contemporary world. 
 Spain is an important country, a mid-level power, with a certain political and economic clout on 
the international scene: today, our country enjoys a global presence. It also has a strong ability for 
promoting dialogue, an ability that is the result of both historical and cultural influences as well as the 
confidence and credibility that have been generated by its international actions and commitments. 
Spain is an influential actor at the UN, but this is a two-way influence. As I have emphasized in this 
study, it is precisely Spain’s active participation in the UN that permits reviewing and correcting the 
occasional shadows that crop up in its political action or in its commitment to human rights. This is 
what Spain’s relationship with the UN is like, in my judgment: an interactive relationship that 
enriches both actors. Our country has contributed, certainly, to influencing the present-day UN, but 
in return its integration into the UN has contributed decisively to turning Spain into a modern, 
democratic State characterized by the rule of law, conscious of its influence in the world and of its 
international commitments. 
